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ABSTRACT:    The “middle-income trap” (MIT) is “real enough” for policy 
makers in developing countries to take it as a serious threat to prospects for 
achieving “high” average income.  Those prospects are further clouded by the 
major changes occurring as the digital revolution moves from connecting 
people to the Internet to connecting the Internet to everything else,  across 
many sectors of human life (the Third Wave).   Both sets of forces raise the 
potential advantages of pro-active industrial policy. Yet mainstream economic 
thinking – and the consensus of international development organizations like 
the World Bank -- has long tended to disapprove of it, in the spirit of “The best 
industrial policy is none at all”.  In light of the middle-income trap, the Third 
Wave, and other conditions in the world economy,  this essay discusses some 
of the big issues in the design of industrial policy, on the theme of how to do it 
well rather than how to do it less. 
 
  
…………………….. 
  
From the mid 19th century till the 1990s western 
economies plus Japan grew faster than non-western 
economies, making for “divergence, big time” (Pritchett 
1997). From the late 1990s till 2008 the majority of 
developing countries grew faster than the US, appearing to 
confirm that “globalization works”. Since 2008 the 
majority of developing countries have grown more slowly 
than the US. This is generally understood as an aberration,  
until the benefits of globalization for developing countries 
reemerge -- provided they adopt yet more free market 
reforms.       
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This understanding overlooks evidence of the long-
term  difficulty facing developing countries in achieving 
“developed country” economic structure and performance.  
 
For example:    
 
 Less than 10 non-western countries have become 
developed during the past two centuries – even 
stretching the categories of non-western, developed, 
and country to include Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Russia, and Israel.  They are almost all small in 
population.   
 
 A World Bank study (2013) identifies 101 countries in 
1960 as “middle-income”. Of those, only 13  reached 
“high-income” by  2008. i  
 
 A study by IMF researchers (Cherif and Hasanov 
2015) defines its income thresholds in terms of 
percentage of US GDP per capita ($PPP 2005), in 
contrast to the World Bank study which uses  
absolute per capita income thresholds.ii  Of 167 low- 
and middle-income economies in 1970, only 9 (5%) 
reached high income by 2010 (46% of US GDP per 
capita). Of these,  7 were small European countries, 
which had already reached upper-middle-income by 
1970 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, 
Malta, Portugal, Slovenia). Only two were non-
European:  Taiwan and South Korea, which shot 
from less than 20% of US income in 1970 to more 
than 65% in 2010. Malaysia, by contrast, was about 
20% in 1970 and 26% in 2010.  Thailand and Chile 
had roughly similar performance as Malaysia (Chile 
doing better over the 2000s thanks to the rise in 
copper prices).  
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 Branko Milanovic (2005) classifies countries into 
four bands of GDP per head. At the top are the “rich 
countries” of the West plus Japan, down to Greece or 
Portugal.  Next are the “contender” countries (those 
with the best chance of making it into the ranks of the 
“rich”), down to two thirds of the income of the 
bottom rich country. Milanovic traces movement 
across two time periods, 1960 to 1978, and 1979 to 
2000. He finds that less than 15% of the contenders 
at the start of each period rose to the rich category by 
the end of the period. A majority of the contenders in 
both periods fell into a lower income category by the 
end of the period. On the other hand,  very few of the 
“rich” countries at the start of each period fell into a 
lower category by the end of the period.  
 
It is as though the rich countries have been held up 
by forces analogous to magnetic levitation (or “glass 
floor”), while many  upper-level “developing”  countries 
are held down – relative to the rich countries --  by forces 
analogous to gravity (or “glass ceiling”).   
 
Brazil is a case in point. Between 1950 and 2010 it  
spent the first 7 years as a “low-income” country and the 
next 53 years as a “lower-middle-income” country. Over 
the 2000s it grew fast, inspiring  The Economist in 2009 
to devote 14 pages to “Latin America’s big success story”. 
Since 2014 the western media has carried almost daily 
reports on its implosion.  The Financial Times ran an 
editorial in 2015 titled “Brazil’s terrible fall from economic 
grace” (14 September). It said, “The economy is in a mess. 
Brazil’s worst recession since the Great Depression will see 
the economy shrink by as much as 3 per cent this year, and 
2 per cent in 2016. Public finances are in disarray …”. 
 
 
The middle-income trap (MIT)  
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 Indermit Gill and Homi Kharas, in An East Asian 
Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth (2007), coined 
the idea of the middle-income trap.  They mention it on 
only two pages in an almost 350 page book, saying little 
more than,  
 
“In the absence of economies of scale, East Asian middle-income 
countries would face an uphill struggle to maintain their 
historically impressive growth. Strategies based on factor 
accumulation are likely to deliver steadily worse results, which is a 
natural occurrence as the marginal productivity of capital declines.  
Latin America and the Middle East are examples of middle-income 
regions that, for decades, have been unable to escape this trap” 
(18). 
 
Figure 1 shows income levels in East and Southeast 
Asia and Latin America from 1960 to 2010 (Ergin 2015).   
We see the early take-off of Japan, and later take-off of 
Hong Kong and South Korea (Taiwan, not shown, was 
ahead of Korea). Then, a long time later and a long way 
down, come the Southeast Asian and Latin American 
countries, clustered together. It makes sense to say that 
these Southeast Asian and Latin American countries have 
been caught in a middle-income trap.  
 
The basic idea of the middle-income trap can be 
represented with a 3 x 3 matrix. The start year (eg 1960) is 
on the horizontal axis, the final year (eg 2008) is on the 
vertical axis. Each axis is divided into high, middle and 
low income.  The idea of the trap is that most economies in 
the middle-income band at the start will  still be in the 
middle-income band at the end; very few will have risen to 
high income. 
 
Felipe et al. (2012), from the Asian Development 
Bank, calculate time spent in the middle-income range, or 
more specifically, the lower-middle-income range, for a 
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large set of economies. They define lower-middle-income,  
following the World Bank at the time of their study,  as a 
per capita GDP of between PPP$ 2,000 and $7,250 a year 
(about $5.50 to $20 a day, in 1990 purchasing power 
parity [PPP] dollars).   
 
They find that between 1950 and 2010  Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and China zoomed through the 
lower-middle-income range in less than 2 decades en 
route to the upper-middle-income range, and then, for the 
first three, the high-income range. 
 
Many Latin American and Caribbean countries spent 
over 4 decades between 1950 and 2010  in the lower-
middle-income range and remained in that category in 
2010: the list includes Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Panama, and Peru.   
 
 Indeed, just about all Latin American countries and 
Middle East countries had reached the lower-middle-
income threshold by the 1960s or 1970s, and most remain 
in or just above this range today.      
 
The Southeast Asian countries come in between. 
Malaysia and Thailand spent almost 3 decades in the 
lower-middle range before rising to upper-middle (where 
they remained as of 2010, when the data set ends). 
Philippines spent more than 3 decades before rising to 
upper-middle. Indonesia remains in the lower-middle 
range, 25 years after rising above the low-income 
threshold.  
 
More evidence for the MIT comes from a study by 
IMF researchers (Aiyar et al., 2013).  They examine the 
frequency of “growth slowdowns” for a large set of 
countries divided into low, middle and high income – 
using 15 plausible absolute income thresholds for the 
“middle-income” range; and define growth slowdowns by 
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a complex formula based on extended deviation 
downwards from the extrapolated growth path at the 
earlier faster rate.  
 
The result is clear: middle income countries have 
more frequent growth slowdowns than low or high income 
countries.  The correlation between middle-income level 
and future growth rates is lower than for low-income and 
high-income countries. See figure 2.  Robertson and Ye 
(2013) confirm Aiyar et al’s conclusions using a somewhat 
different measure of middle income.  
 
Lant Pritchett and Lawrence Summers (2014) qualify 
the argument. They find that the correlation between 
country income level and subsequent growth slowdowns is 
lower than that between fast pace of growth and 
subsequent sharp slowdowns, at whatever income level.   
 
The dominant tendency in growth patterns, they say, 
is regression to the global mean.  Specifically, episodes of 
“super-fast” growth ( 6% per year or more) lasting more 
than 15 years are uncommon. China set the world record 
by 2010 (end of data), when it had experienced super-fast 
growth for each of the previous 33 years. The only 
countries which come close are Taiwan, 32 years (1962 – 
94) and South Korea, 29 years (1962 – 91).     
 
Pritchett and Summers use these results to challenge  
“Asiaphoria”, the presumption that the  center of gravity of 
the world economy is shifting rapidly to China and India, 
based on extrapolating China and India’s recent fast 
growth far ahead. An example is the OECD report  
Looking to 2060: Long-term Global Growth Prospects 
(2012), which forecasts per capita growth from 2011 to 
2020 at 6.6% for China and 6.7% for India.   
 
Such forecasts overlook the dominant statistical 
pattern, regression to the global mean. They implicitly 
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assume that countries’ own past growth has a weight of 1 
and the global mean a weight of 0; whereas the evidence 
suggests that the weights should be more like 0.2 for past 
growth and 0.8 for global mean growth.  That China had 
already set the world record for duration of super-fast 
growth by 2010 makes its sharp slowdown after 2012  
unsurprising.  
 
Both Aiyer et al. 2013 and Pritchett and Summers 
2014 may be right:  sharp growth slowdowns and extended 
low growth in the broad middle-income range may be 
caused – in the proximate sense – by a combination of 
middle-income level and sustained fast growth  followed 
by regression to the global mean.  
 
 We can conclude that the middle-income trap is not 
well supported empirically if taken to mean a specific 
average income threshold (eg $10,000) at which a 
country will -- with high probability -- experience a sharp  
growth deceleration followed by prolonged semi-
stagnation (Im and Rosenblatt 2013).  
 
But if we use the idea in a looser, more metaphorical 
sense to mean that countries in a broad middle-income 
band have a higher probability than low- or high-income 
countries that a period of fast growth will be followed by a 
sharp slow-down and sustained lower-than-average 
growth for a decade or so, it is “real enough” to be taken 
seriously by national policy makers and international 
development organizations.  
 
Still, income alone (whether level or speed of growth) 
is not determining. We noted the variation between  
regions.  Timing and geopolitics also matter.  Taiwan and 
South Korea emerged early after the Second World War, 
thanks to  relatively high productive investment during 
several pre-war decades of Japanese colonial rule, and 
high levels of post-war US aid induced by their location 
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next to the communist bloc. They had few competitors 
compared to countries which started later when the world 
was more globalized, which faced fierce competition in 
labour-intensive and capital-intensive manufacturing. 
Israel – which might be included in the list of non-western 
success stories -- developed on the back of enormous 
wealth and technology injected through the US Defence 
Department, the Jewish diaspora, and preferential trade 
agreements with Britain and the Commonwealth.  
 
China is probably going to escape upwards, following  
its neighbours Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. But 
China’s average income is still very low. Depending on 
how calculated, it is between 10% and 20% of US average 
income, and so at most in the lower reaches of the lower-
middle-income band according to the criteria of the Cherif 
and Hasanov study cited earlier. China has a long road to 
climb before it comes close to the high income threshold.   
 
Mechanisms of the MIT 
 
How to escape the MIT depends on why most 
countries are caught.   The literature suggests several  
mechanisms.  One strand says the causes are too little 
investment in education and too little “good governance”; 
so the escape route is more investment in education and 
more reform of governance. To which one can give a clear 
maybe.  Raising the share of the population with 
secondary and tertiary education may reduce the chances 
of experiencing growth slowdowns; but the causality is 
difficult to establish, and the causality of something as 
broad as governance reforms even more so (see 
Kanchoochat and Intarakumnerd 2014; Besley and 
Persson 2011).  
 
There are several more plausible mechanisms for the 
MIT.  
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Diminishing returns to inter-sectoral reallocation and 
factor accumulation 
 
Countries in the low-income range can grow fast on 
the back of (a) cheap labor, (b) transfer of people and 
other resources  from low-productivity agriculture to 
higher-productivity manufacturing and (some) services 
in cities, (c) investment to GDP ratios rising from low to 
medium, and (d) simple imitation of more sophisticated 
technology. But as a country’s average income continues 
to rise, these sources of growth yield diminishing returns.  
 
 
Export structure 
 
A second mechanism relates to the sophistication and 
diversification of the production structure, and 
specifically the export structure.  Jesus Felipe and co-
authors (2012) compare countries which spent more than 
the average time in the lower-middle-income range with 
countries which spent less than the average time before 
ascending to  the upper-middle-income range. They find 
that the former have a significantly less sophisticated and 
less diversified export structure than the latter. With 
reference to the same comparison at the upper-middle-
income level, they test only for the diversification of 
export products, and find that countries which spend 
more than the average time in the upper-middle range 
have significantly less diversified exports than those that 
spend less time there before ascending to high income. In 
the same vein, Imbs and Wacziarg 2003 find that – 
contrary to neoclassical orthodoxy about the advantages 
of specialization in line with comparative advantage -- 
per capita income is positively correlated with a more 
diversified production structure until a turning point at 
around $20,000 in today’s dollars, far above the normal 
range of “middle income”. Above this,  income per capita 
is positively correlated with production specialization. 
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Jan Fagerberg and co-authors qualify the argument 
about the importance of diversified export structure 
(2007). They find, across a large set of countries, that 
countries which in 1980-82 had a relatively high 
proportion of their exports from four categories of goods 
(ICT, pharmaceuticals, instruments, other machinery) 
enjoyed higher subsequent GDP growth to 2000-02 than 
countries with less of their exports from these industries 
–for the reason that these four categories experienced the 
fastest growth of world trade of products (defined at the 3 
digit SITC classification).  So countries which specialized 
relatively more in these four product categories had a 
high level of “demand competitiveness”, in Fagerberg et 
al’s phrase.  This qualifies the idea that export 
diversification per se is what matters. 
 
Foreign ownership and glass ceiling 
 
A third mechanism is the difficulty faced by countries 
whose manufacturing sector is dominated by foreign-
owned firms and dependent on technology imports in 
transitioning to one controlled by local managers and 
with substantial local technology development.  Kenichi 
Ohno (2009) calls this a “glass ceiling”.    
 
  Multinational corporations (MNCs) tend not to act as 
conduits for technology diffusion to local firms. They 
generally prefer to use in-house production or imports 
from their own suppliers, source only simple content 
from local firms, and repatriate profits. They locate their 
R&D departments not in foreign locations but close to the 
marketing departments, generally at headquarters.  
    
When local firms do manage to integrate themselves 
into “global” manufacturing value chains (which in fact 
are mostly “regional”) they may find themselves locked 
into low value-added manufacturing activities – which 
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take on economic qualities similar to low value-added 
commodities. Without vigorous state action to counter 
this lock-in a country’s firms may be blocked from 
upgrading to higher value-added items within given 
product categories or jump to a different set of 
manufactured products with higher value-added 
(UNCTAD 2014; Paus 2014; Kaplinsky 2005). 
 
Low investment to GDP 
 
 Low investment to GDP is both cause and effect of 
the above mechanisms. Table 1 shows gross capital 
formation to GDP for a mix of regions and income 
categories (not middle-income per se), between 1970 and 
2014.  China, again, stands out for its high ratio, perhaps 
the highest ever recorded. Well below China comes the 
rest of East Asia and Pacific region. And well below the 
latter comes the average for low- and –middle-income 
countries in the rest of the world, whose ratio has 
remained remarkably constant over this time period.     
 
 
Brazil  
 
  Figure 3 shows the dramatic fall in the share of 
manufacturers in Brazil’s exports between 2000 and 
2014, and the increase in the share of commodities like 
iron ore, oil seeds, petroleum products and meat.  
Between 2002 and 2011 commodities rose from 28% of 
Brazil’s total exports to 48%; manufactures fell from 55% 
to 37%.   
 
Between 2003 (start of the Lula government) and  
2012 Brazil’s exports to China increased by an 
astonishing 30 times. As of 2010 China became Brazil’s 
biggest trading partner, displacing the US.  In 2010 80% 
of Brazil’s exports to China comprised just three 
commodities: crude oil, iron ore, and soybeans. At the 
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same time, 98% of Brazil’s imports from China were 
manufactured goods. Most of the elaborate costumes 
worn for Brazil’s carnivale are now made in China.  
 
In the light of the above findings about the tendency 
of middle-income countries with relatively undiversified 
and unsophisticated production and export structure to 
get stuck in the middle-income range, these trends are 
bad news for Brazil.  Without reversing the specialization 
in commodity exports induced by Chinese demand over 
the 2000s the economy is likely to remain in the middle-
income range for a long time ahead (recall that it spent 
the last 53 years of the period between 1950 and 2010 in 
the lower-middle-income range).  
 
Southeast Asia 
 
For Southeast Asia,  Shahid Yusuf and Kaoru 
Nabeshima, in  Tiger Economies Under Threat (2009), 
say the following:    
 
 “Unlike the original East Asian Tiger economies, the Southeast 
Asian Tigers [including Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, 
Indonesia] have yet to build the indigenous capacity to design, to 
innovate, and to diversity into new and more profitable areas with 
good long-run prospects, and very few of their firms have created 
regional – much less global – brand names…. More disquietening 
is the sparseness of backward links from MNC operations, which 
would signify progressive industrial deepening, as has occurred in 
Korea and Taiwan [China], and as is already under way in China. 
This lack of backward links means that domestic value-added in 
manufacturing remains low. Moreover, none of these countries 
has nurtured large and dynamic producers of tradable services” 
(10).  
 
  With reference to Malaysia they say:  
 
“Malaysian industry appears to be sliding down the technological 
slope, and incentives for workers to improve their skills are 
weakening” (26). 
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This is all the more striking because Malaysia has a large 
concentration of foreign-owned firms (especially on the 
island of Penang) producing “high tech” products. But 
they are “cathedrals in the desert”, not much integrated 
into the domestic economy.   
 
 Recall that Malaysia’s income was about 20% that of 
the US in 1970 and reached 26% by 2010; and that Taiwan 
and Korea were less than 20% in 1970 and reached 65% or 
more by 2010. Yet for the past three decades Malaysia has 
achieved  most of the standard growth recipe as Taiwan 
and Korea in the 1970s (including export sophistication, 
years of secondary schooling, infrastructure, macro-
stability, trade openness) – but has not experienced their 
sustained fast  growth. It is plausible that the key 
differences are that Malaysia (and the same applies to 
many other developing countries, including Thailand and 
Chile) was much later than Taiwan and Korea in pushing 
out of natural resource specialization, and during that 
push has invested little in local technology creation, as 
seen in low levels of R&D relative to GDP,  low levels of 
patenting, and low share of graduates in engineering, 
manufacturing and construction. Rather, Malaysia has 
given priority to attracting FDI (Cherif and Hasanov 2015; 
but for a qualification see Rock 2007).      
 
Another MIT mechanism: the debt trap 
 
  We have identified three mechanisms of lock-in to 
the middle-income range, all related to production: 
diminishing returns to simple inter-sectoral resource 
transfer and factor accumulation; lack of diversification 
and sophistication of exports; and largely foreign-owned 
manufacturing sector, going with local firms’ passive 
integration into labor-intensive parts of regional value 
chains.  
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Then there is the “foreign debt trap”.  From the 1970s 
till today western international organizations and 
development economists have urged developing country 
governments to adopt a strategy of “economic growth 
with  foreign borrowing” (Bresser Pereira et al., 2008, 
2014).  The rationale is that more foreign borrowing 
permits a higher rate of domestic investment than less 
foreign borrowing.  Advocates of the foreign borrowing 
strategy tend to downplay the dangers of the country 
overborrowing in relation to ability to repay. The 
overborrowing may result from the foreign loans being 
used to raise consumption rather than investment and 
generate a “feel good” sentiment in the population at 
large; or from the foreign borrowing being  at variable 
interest rates and then the US Federal Reserve hikes its 
interest rates, suddenly multiplying the debt burden for 
developing country borrowers.   
 
When developing countries fall into a debt trap they 
become vulnerable to the West’s “Washington 
Consensus” conditionalities, which generally include 
abandoning a proactive state role in trade and industry. 
At the time of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-99 
excited IMF officials asked their World Bank colleagues 
across 19th Street in Washington DC to send them lists of 
conditionalities they at  the World Bank wished to impose 
on the crisis countries, describing the crisis as a golden 
opportunity.  The combined IMF and World Bank 
conditionalities on the emergency loans to South Korea, 
Thailand, and Indonesia went far beyond measures 
related to getting out of the crisis, into a  privatization 
and market liberalization drive that the organizations and 
the western states which run them had long wanted. 
Hence the crisis is known in the region as “the IMF 
crisis”.  iii   A leading American figure in setting the IMF’s 
and World Bank’s conditionalities in emergency loans to 
East and Southeast Asian countries in the debt crisis of 
1997-1999 explained in private,  “If we can’t get them 
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when they’re down, we’ll never get them” (personal 
conversation, 2000). 
 
In short, many but not all middle income countries 
have rates of long-run growth too low to bring them into 
the high income category within four or five decades of 
exiting the low income category. Countries in this “trap” 
experience a pattern of volatile growth, which itself 
reflects (1) relatively low “production capabilities”  (hence 
the idea of a “middle capabilities trap”: Paus 2014), as 
seen in relatively undiversified and unsophisticated 
export product composition; and (2) relatively frequent 
and/or severe foreign debt crises followed by slow 
growth.  
 
Escaping the MIT by upgrading production structure and 
production-related services 
 
  We can agree that raising the ability of a relatively 
poor national economy to create income and wealth 
requires transformation of production structure (coupled 
with managed rather than free integration into 
international financial markets). The question is how to 
transform the production and export structure in the 
direction of more sophisticated and more diversified 
products (including services), and not just in an enclave 
of foreign-owned firms, as in Malaysia’s Penang.   
 
  This brings us to the contentious subject of industrial 
policy (IP). The mainstream (since the ascendance of 
neoclassical economics in the 1980s) has said that 
selective industrial policy is either ineffective or net 
harmful. This reflects the unification of neoclassical  
economics around antagonism to the planned economy, 
managed trade and an extensive welfare state.   A small 
band of dissidents has argued for the potential benefits of 
selective industrial policy (Wade 2015).   
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Being difficult to resolve theoretically or empirically, 
the debate goes round and round.  The theory is 
ambiguous, partly because the concepts (such as market 
failure,  costs and benefits of “correcting” market failure) 
are so elastic. Advocates of different prior positions on 
the role of the state can draw the boundaries of costs and 
benefits where they wish.  
 
  Empirical studies are limited by the difficulty of 
establishing causality in the absence of an exogenous 
source of variation. They rely on correlations between, for 
example, the economic rise of western states and Japan 
and the role of governments in creating and shaping 
markets (not just fixing market failures), using selective 
protection, subsidies, standards and patenting to support 
business ventures (Wade 2014); and between the post-
Second World War rise of South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and a few other cases and a broadly similarly 
active role of the state (Wade 1990b). But in the absence 
of an exogenous source of variation (as with randomized 
control trials) these correlations are always open to 
alternative causal mechanisms.  
 
This may help explain why hardly any “top” 
economists work on industrial policy, and why hardly any 
“top” economics journals publish papers on industrial 
policy. Yet policy-makers are increasingly wanting advice 
on industrial policy (even if they do not use that phrase), 
especially after 2008.  
 
Below I review some of the main debates about IP, 
including both “why IP?”, and “how to do it well”. But 
first I should flag up two major issues that have received 
little attention. The first is the conditions which make for  
innovative enterprises -- ones which produce higher 
quality or lower cost products than previously produced 
in the national territory. The IP debate has tended to be 
state-centric and overlook the point that the agenda for 
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IP has to be formulated in relation to the dynamics of 
innovative enterprise. It is their combination which 
carries the promise of fast economic development 
(Lazonick 2008, Sutton 2012, Mazzucato 2013).  
 
The second issue is that major economic sectors are 
in the  early stages of upheaval, as the digital revolution 
rolls out beyond connecting people to the Internet 
(underway since the 1980s) to connecting the Internet 
into Everything. Steve Case (2016) calls this the Third 
Wave.  The industries at the heart of the Third Wave, 
including energy, transport, education and healthcare, 
are necessarily heavily regulated (as Second Wave 
innovations like Google and Facebook are not). The 
extent to which the innovations take hold in each country 
depends heavily on the response of governments. IP has 
to be framed in a way that encourages firms across 
middle-income countries to adopt Third Wave 
innovations, and indeed to make them. The alternative is 
more time stuck in the middle-income range.          
 
The links between IP, innovative enterprise, and the 
Third Wave have received little attention in the literature. 
Having flagged them here, I go over more familiar 
subjects of debate.      
 
Fixing market failure, or more? 
 
The mainstream “market failure” approach to 
industrial policy rests on a distinction between sectoral (or 
vertical) targeting and functional (or horizontal) targeting 
of interventions. Functional refers to functions which may 
be undertaken across the board, not limited to particular 
sectors, and functional policy refers to policies such as 
R&D subsidies, or special access to credit for small and 
medium enterprises.  
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The mainstream considers functional policy more 
acceptable than sectoral policy. But the distinction is 
largely meaningless. Almost all state policies beyond basic 
education and health impact some sectors more than 
others.  Their different impacts should be planned for.  
 
The mainstream posits a trade-off between the 
inefficiency costs of leaving market failures unattended 
versus the inefficiency costs caused by government 
intervention to correct market failures. The policy 
conclusion is that state “intervention” can be justified in 
sectors or functions where (1) the market fails (the 
necessary condition), and (2) the costs caused by the 
intervention are less than the costs of leaving the market 
failure unattended (the sufficient condition). Beyond 
fixing market failure, policy intervention is unjustified 
except in unusual circumstances. The practical question is 
how to identify and measure the costs of “market failure” 
and “government failure”.   
 
Mainstream economists tend to presume that the 
above two conditions greatly restrict the legitimate scope 
for government intervention. But others emphasise the 
pervasiveness of information and coordination 
externalities as causes of market failure.  Externalities 
mean effects external to the decisions of uncoordinated 
private profit-seeking actors, which those actors do not 
have to take account of.  
 
 Information externalities mean that a private 
entrepreneur has limited incentives to invest in  
experimenting and innovating, because if the project  
succeeds others can imitate without paying the experiment 
costs, while if the project fails the entrepreneur bears the 
costs. Information externalities mean that desirable 
experimentation, self-discovery and R&D investment by 
entrepreneurs will be socially sub-optimal.  “Socialized 
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benefits and privatized costs” does not  successful 
capitalism make. 
 
Coordination externalities imply that investment is 
hampered if upstream and downstream investments are 
not made more or less simultaneously – especially when 
economies of scale are large, such that costs of production 
per unit fall steeply as output rises.  
 
 These external effects can justify a proactive role of 
the state in bearing (“socializing”) some of the risk.  
Commonly, though, the state fails to design the contract so 
that it gets a financial return on its “interventions” when 
these help to generate private sector profit, as does a 
venture capitalist. Commonly, the state bears the costs and 
the private sector reaps the financial gain, leading to 
underfunding of public R&D (Lazonick 2008, Mazzucato 
2013). “Socialized costs and privatized benefits” 
undermines capitalism as much as the opposite.    
 
Industrial policy within or also beyond existing  
comparative advantage? 
 
  Neoclassical economists tend to take the theory of 
comparative advantage and the policy of free trade as 
articles of faith.  Paul Krugman remarks, “If there were 
an Economist’s Creed, it would surely contain the 
affirmations ‘I understand the Principle of Comparative 
Advantage’ and ‘I advocate Free Trade’” (1987: 131).  
 
  The key justification for free trade (and in effect little 
or no industrial policy) is that it results in the efficient 
allocation of resources and therefore in maximum 
material welfare benefits from those resources – and is 
mutually beneficial to all economies which practice it. 
Anything less than free trade implies sacrificing the social 
welfare for the profit of special interests.    
 
20 
 
 
 
  The justification for free trade policy rests on the 
theory of comparative advantage.  Yet the theory, to 
achieve  its  logical coherence, contradicts the conditions 
it is meant to apply to. It assumes, as a necessary 
condition,  perfect competition in all markets in all the 
relevant countries. If there is not perfect competition in 
some markets in some countries the theory gives no 
solution.  Also,  the theory assumes a raft of “no’s”:  no 
externalities; no increasing returns; no factor mobility 
between countries; and no technical change.  
   
  Rather than frame the choice as “free trade versus 
managed (therefore inefficient) trade”  we should frame it 
as “state following the market or state leading the 
market”.  “Following” means that the state places bets to 
support selected investments which private profit-seeking 
actors would want to do anyway,  helping them to go 
further and faster than otherwise (Wade 1990a).  It 
means the state promoting some activities ahead of 
others, but within the limits of the economy’s existing 
comparative advantage.  “Leading” the market means the 
state pushing resources into activities that the private 
sector would not undertake without sizable state 
assistance.  In any sector periods of followership and 
leadership may alternate.  
 
Exhibit A of leading the market is South Korea’s 
POSCO (formerly Pohang Iron and Steel Company), 
initiated in 1968 as a largely state-owned enterprise,  
against the emphatic advice of the World Bank and the 
US government, which said that steel was not in Korea’s 
comparative advantage (radios were).  After receiving 
intensive state protection in the first decade it became the 
fifth biggest steel company in the world by the late 1980s 
and part of the foundation of Korea’s fast transition to a 
fully developed economy.  
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  Justin Yifu Lin, chief economist of the World Bank 
from 2008 to 2012, advocates a “following the market” 
industrial policy (though he does not use that term). 
Selected sectors should receive some protection and 
investment support, but only products and technologies 
within the economy’s existing comparative advantage ( 
perhaps with a few exceptions, like China’s entry into the 
satellite industry). Over time, he says, the growth of these 
targeted activities will endogenously change the economy’s 
endowment structure and hence its comparative 
advantage.  
 
“The best way for a developing country to achieve sustained, 
dynamic growth is to follow comparative advantage in its 
industrial development and to tap into the potential of advantages 
of backwardness in industrial upgrading” (2012: 397, emphasis 
added).    
 
 Notice that the justification is not to do with politics 
– the (alleged) inability of most developing country 
governments to “lead” the market effectively.  It is that 
limiting industrial policy to promotion of activities within 
the economy’s existing comparative advantage is the best 
path, even for high-capacity governments.  
 
 This is strange, for both empirical and theoretical 
reasons.  Empirically, there is plausible (though always 
contestable) evidence that the now developed countries 
effectively adopted promotion measures during their 
industrialization which “stretched” comparative advantage 
rather than stay within its limits, however defined. There 
is plausible evidence that the most successful developing 
countries in the post-Second World War period – 
including Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and 
Israel – also invested far beyond their comparative 
advantage at any one point in time (Wade, 1990b, 1992).  
 
 The standard reply of neoclassical development 
economists (and modestly heterodox ones like Lin) is: “ 
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but they stayed within their dynamic comparative 
advantage”.  Lin suggests that one can identify products 
and technologies within a country’s dynamic comparative 
advantage by looking at the export composition of 
countries with per capita income twice as high (Lin and 
Chang 2009). But where the twice comes from is unclear. 
The standard reply easily becomes tautology.   
 
 The extent to which the now developed countries and 
the unusually successful post-war developing countries 
listed above complied with criteria of comparative 
advantage has been debated between Lin and Ha-Joon 
Chang (2009).  My conclusion is that the evidence favors 
Chang: it can justify a state in promoting activities that 
lead the market, or “stretch” (like a rubber membrane) 
existing comparative advantage even beyond Lin’s 
criterion. I leave the issue here  (Wade 2011).  
 
   
Policy instruments? 
 
Another focus of debate concerns policy instruments. 
“Price” instruments like tariffs and selective subsidies are 
relatively easy to implement; but they are constrained by 
WTO rules. However, the fact that WTO rules “prohibit” 
certain instruments does not mean that a government 
which uses them will be punished.  Governments which 
consider national interest to have been damaged by the 
actions of another government  have to bring a case to the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism.  This is typically a 
cumbersome and costly process, and it is by no means 
automatic that a government which uses a “prohibited”, let 
alone “actionable”  instrument will be penalized (Aggarwal 
and Evenett 2010; Wade 2003). 
 
 The other big point is that plenty of scope remains 
within or on the edge of WTO rules for non-price 
instruments.  These include:  
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 Coordination of investments via (1) entry regulation, 
(2) investment cartels, (3) negotiated capacity cuts.   
 
 Policies to achieve economies of scale, such as (1) 
production licensing conditional on production scale, 
(2) state-mediated mergers and acquisitions.   
 
 Regulation of technology imports, such as screening 
for import of obsolete technology.  
 
 Regulation of FDI, via (1) ownership restrictions,  (2) 
local content requirements,  (3) technology transfer 
requirements,  (4) mandatory worker training.  
 
 Export promotion, via (1) subsidies, (2) loan 
guarantees,  (3) marketing support,  (4) national 
campaigns to persuade producers it is their “national 
duty” to export, supplemented with prestigious 
export prizes. 
 
 Government allocation of foreign exchange, 
prioritizing imports of capital goods and discouraging 
imports of luxury consumer goods (Kanchoochat and  
Intarakumnerd 2014). 
 
 
Another key instrument in the capitalist East Asian 
cases was publicly funded R&D, aimed (in the early 
decades) at domesticating and disseminating foreign 
technologies in priority sectors. The governments did not 
rely on western or Japanese MNCs to transfer and diffuse 
new technologies.  For example, the Taiwan  
government established the Industrial Research and 
Training Institute (ITRI), with a staff of some 10,000 by 
the early 1980s.  One of its institutes was the Electronics 
and Service Organization (ERSO), with a staff of around 
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700.  ITRI was matched on the military technology side by 
a parallel organization, which had around 20,000 staff by 
the early 1980s – and whose R&D spilled over into civilian 
uses. Taiwan at that time had a population of around 19 
mn, and GDP per head about 40% that of the United 
States (Wade 1990b).  The government actively cultivated 
networks between researchers at home and Taiwanese 
working overseas, notably a “technical community” linking 
home researchers with Silicon Valley.     
 
 Whatever the instruments, the general principles for 
the design of incentive systems suggest – and capitalist 
East Asian experience confirms – that targeted assistance 
must be given against performance conditions and built-in 
monitoring against benchmarks (such as price and quality 
of competing imports); and with clear exit mechanisms, 
such as sunset clauses.  More specifically: 
 
 Support a relatively small number of sectors at any 
one time; and target fiscal investment incentives at 
the production of new products or products on the 
performance frontier within the country. As more 
than a few producers become able to meet the 
standards, adjust the targets upwards.   
 
 Think of promoting exports and replacing imports as 
complements rather than substitutes, “two wings of 
the same bird”.  Schemes such as duty drawbacks can 
be used to protect exporters from import protection.  
See Wade 1991 for a simple account of the nuts and 
bolts of Taiwan’s duty drawback scheme.  
 
 Use protection not to insulate domestic producers 
from international competitive pressure but to buffer  
them – for example by limiting protection to a certain 
period within which protected producers must reach 
close to the price and quality of imported substitutes 
(Wade 1993). 
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We are left with a puzzle: why are developing country 
governments willing and often enthusiastic to sign on to 
trade and investment agreements with developed  country 
governments which greatly restrict their policy space – 
well beyond that allowed by WTO rules (as described 
above)? Developed country governments claim that they 
(developing countries) face a trade-off:  “your policy space 
or good access to our markets”. So developing country 
governments give up policy space – often in return for  
little improvement in market access. Their choice helps to 
protect the hierarchical structure of the world economy.   
 
 
Distinguish between additive and parallel value chains, 
which require a somewhat different development strategy  
 
 Additive value chains are those where a product is 
processed in a sequence of steps, which cannot be done in 
parallel. They are found mainly in natural resource 
sectors, such as cocoa and steel. Parallel value chains, 
found mainly in manufacturing, entail the production of 
components then assembled into final products. The 
components can be made by independent producers 
operating in different locations. Roughly half of world 
trade is in parallel value chains, and another quarter in 
additive value chains.  
 
 Additive value chains give more scope (than parallel 
ones) for industrial policy focused on deepening upstream 
and downstream links within a national territory – for 
additional processing of agricultural commodities, or 
deepening steel production into production of steel-
making equipment.  Parallel value chains tend – since 
“production globalization” in the 1990s – to be less 
promising for deepening in specific sectors, because 
industrial policy resources put into raising the 
competitiveness of producing certain components may be 
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wasted as rival producers in other locations gain 
competitiveness, and existing producers have to “run to 
stand still”, producing larger output at lower prices.  
 
In the case of parallel value chains, more policy 
emphasis should be given to building “capabilities” of 
several kinds; including assembly capabilities which can 
be deployed in many sectors, and also service capabilities 
at the two ends of value chains, in design and marketing. 
China’s strength is not in making components for the 
iPhone, but in assembly of iPhones and many other 
electronic items.  The UK car industry’s strength is less in 
making car parts (60% are imported) and more in 
assembly and branding (Kaplinsky and Morris 2015). 
 
How to establish an effective industrial policy agency 
 
The argument so far points to the need for one or 
more agencies tasked with prescribing actions to be taken 
now in order to improve the economy’s future growth. 
Cross-country evidence suggests some rules of thumb for 
how to create and sustain effective agencies,  even in a 
surrounding bureaucratic swamp:  “islands of excellence” 
or “pockets of effectiveness”  (Roll 2013).   
 
 The top of government must be committed to the 
mission of diversifying and upgrading production 
structure. 
 
 The agency director must be appointed by the top. 
 
 The appointment should by-pass normal, patronage 
criteria – probably against a lot of elite opposition. 
 
 The director will come from outside the inner elite. 
This makes the director less vulnerable to the 
“insider’s dilemma”.  A director from inside the inner 
elite will be under strong pressure to appoint inside-
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elite staff (including adult children of the inner elite), 
which risks staffing the agency with incompetence 
and unmotivated people,  opening the director to 
attack for running an ineffective agency. On the other 
hand, if the director does not staff from the inner 
elite the agency may be rendered ineffective by 
attacks from  those spurned. 
 
 Initially the director has weak political ties to the top 
political authority; but once appointed must develop 
strong ties to the top, for defence of the agency. 
 
 The director must protect the autonomy of the 
agency by manipulating connections to politicians, 
firms, unions. Autonomy is not the same as 
“separate” and is not fixed in law.  Autonomy is 
relational, it has to be constantly fought for.  
 
 To make sensible decisions on “directional thrust” 
the agency must engage in dense dialogue with the 
private sector and state-owned enterprises. In this 
way the agency can protect itself against the always-
ready charge that it is “picking winners”  (or in the 
vocabulary above, “leading the market”). In the dense 
dialogue the distinction between leading and 
following the market becomes blurred.  
 
 Dense dialogue with the business sector poses the 
acute question of the integrity of agency staff, which 
relates to remuneration.  The Singapore solution is 
worth copying. Set senior public service salary grades 
by explicit comparison with the nearest equivalents 
in the private sector. For example, set the 
remuneration of the top civil servant in a certain 
agency as the average of the remuneration of the top 
five executives in the nearest private sector jobs, so 
that as the latters’ remuneration rises, so does the top 
civil servant’s; and so on down. Combine with severe 
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sanctions against civil service corruption (Wade 
1985).    
       
Of course, the “political settlements” of a society may 
make this read like a utopian prescription (Khan 2013). 
Many rulers appoint their friends and relatives to top 
positions (think Ukraine, Nigeria) so as to shore up 
their hold on power and stabilize the regime.  The result 
is likely to be ineffective agencies.  As noted at the start, 
sustained economic development is very difficult; it is 
not generated “by itself” in real-world capitalisms if 
only government gets out of the way.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Apart from mega China and tiny Taiwan (off  China’s 
coast),  no national economy has grown at more than 6 
percent a year for 30 years or more. Others have managed 
6 percent or more for 10-15 years, only to experience a 
protracted growth slowdown.  Sharp growth slowdowns 
seem to be more frequent among middle- income 
countries than either low- or high-income countries. The 
sheer difficulties of becoming developed are underlined by 
the small number of non-western countries which have 
become developed in the past two centuries; less than ten. 
An even smaller number of “developed countries” in 1960  
became “developing” by 2010.  There seems to be a “glass 
ceiling” and “glass floor” in the world economy.  
 
 The glass ceiling and floor may have become even 
stronger in the past two decades, owing to the big forces 
which developing countries have to take as given as they 
integrate into the world economy:  financialization (with 
the centers of finance still mostly in the West and the US 
dollar still the dominant international currency); high 
market concentration and market power in the hands of 
western MNCs; insufficient global demand (except when  
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fueled by unsustainable debt);  the digital revolution, with 
robotics cutting manufacturing and middle-class jobs; and 
now the upheavals of the Third Wave. 
 
 Sectorally targeted industrial policy can help 
developing countries escape the middle-income trap, and 
was (probably) effective in East Asia. But it is anything but 
a silver bullet – more for political rather than narrowly 
economic reasons. Once industrial diversification and 
upgrading incentives of various kinds become available, 
potential beneficiaries have incentives to “fish the 
government for fools” -- to take the money and run, to 
press for trade protection and subsidies with no 
performance conditions or ones easily fudged.  
 
Brazil is again a case in point. Regulations 
promulgated for the car assembly industry in 2011 
included local content requirements fudged in a way that 
allowed foreign-owned assemblers to include expenses for 
marketing, public relations and lobbying; and that 
required a mere o.5% of gross revenues to be spent on 
R&D, far less than the industry spends in other countries. 
Thanks to measures like these, plus substantial trade 
protection, the car assemblers have enjoyed profit rates of 
around 10%, three times the common rate in the US 
market. Similarly in electronics. The Taiwanese-owned 
company Foxconn has established factories in Brazil and 
received subsidies amounting to 10-15 % of the retail price, 
enabling imports to be undercut; yet the (real) value-
added in Brazil is small, because most is in imported 
components.            
 
It is easy to see why industrial policies like the 
Brazilian ones just described are a mistake; and also why 
implementing well designed ones can be politically and 
administratively difficult.  But it bears repeating that the 
neoclassical or Washington Consensus package is unlikely 
to yield upwards income convergence, because  
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convergence is often blocked by market, property, and 
political forces , including those which make the middle-
income trap.   
 
Well designed, well implemented industrial policies, 
particularly targeted at boosting the capabilities of local 
production and service firms, are an almost necessary -- 
but not sufficient -- condition for a country to ascend 
relatively fast through the middle income range, against 
the “gravitational” forces of the world economy and world 
politics. (Of course, a country sitting on oil,  diamonds, 
copper, lithium or other natural resources may also ascend 
quickly for as long as demand holds up.) Once in the high 
income range, several kinds of “levitation” or “glass floor” 
forces will tend to keep it there, including trade and 
investment agreements with poorer economies favourable 
to itself (Wade 2003, UNCTAD 2014).  
 
In short, developing country policy makers should be 
doubly cautious about accepting the dictum of German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, referring to national 
exercises of foresight, “People who have visions should see 
a doctor”. They should follow Thomas Edison’s,  “Vision 
without execution is hallucination”. END 
 
 
 
 The author thanks  Ipek Ergin for helpful discussions about 
the middle-income trap. 
……….. 
 
Figure 1. East Asian, Southeast Asian and Latin American 
average incomes, 1960 – 2010  ( Ergin, 2015)  
_______________ 
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Figure 2. Frequency of growth slowdowns at 
different middle-income ranges (Aiyer et al 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Gross capital formation/GDP, selected entities 
 1970 1990 2012 1980 - 2014 
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China 33  36 47 40 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
minus 
China  
23 32 30 28 
LICs & 
MICs minus 
East Asia  
22 22 25 23 
 
 Source: World Development Indicators, 12/22/2015 
 
 
Figure 3.  Brazilian exports, selected products % of 
total merchandise exports, 2000, 2014 
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i Different sources at different times use different definitions of income thresholds. The 
World Bank now uses Gross National Income per capita, calculated using the World Bank 
Atlas method.  As of mid 2015, it defined low-income economies as those with a GNI per 
capita of $1,045 or less in 2014; middle-income economies as those with a GNI per capita of 
more than $1,045 but less than $12,736; high-income economies as those with a GNI per 
capita of $12,736 or more. It separated lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income 
economies at $4,125."  http://data.worldbank.org/news/new-country-
classifications-2015.  The 13 economies which rose to high-income include: 
Equatorial Guinea, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, 
Portugal, Puerto Rico, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan.   
ii The IMF study  takes the median as the threshold for “upper-middle-income”, which 
in 2010 translated into $6,600 and 16% of the US average income.   It takes the 75th 
percentile as the threshold of “high income”, which translated into $19,050 and 46% of 
the US average.  
iii For the inside story of the East Asian crisis of 1997-99 see Blustein 2001; also Wade  1998a, 1998b.  
The Chiang Mai Initiative was established by the ASEAN plus Three countries to provide themselves 
with a means of by-passing the IMF in future crises.  See Wade 2013a, 2013b.   
